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Abstract 
 The Civil Rights and Women’s Rights Movements were two parallel 
rights revolutions in American history. Each spurred noteworthy social change for 
a disadvantaged group, through affirmative action for African Americans and 
through Title IX programs for women. However, in looking at the college 
enrollment data, it becomes clear that these programs achieved success at 
different rates—at least in higher education. This thesis is an attempt to explain 
why these seemingly analogous programs produced such disparate results. It 
attempts to answer the question: Did in-group bias influence public opinion and 
public backlash in the form of Supreme Court litigation, impacting the time it 
took for race-based affirmative action programs to achieve success in comparison 
with similar women’s rights initiatives? 
 In studying affirmative action and Title IX, this thesis examines both 
public opinion data and Supreme Court litigation surrounding each program. In 
doing so, it attempts to argue that in-group bias colors the public opinion data, 
diminishing the support for race-based affirmative action. It also attempts to show 
that public backlash, in the form of Supreme Court litigation, presents a direct 
challenge to race-based affirmative action in higher education. On the contrary, 
there are no Supreme Court cases that question the need for Title IX enforcement 
in the academic sector of higher education.  
 The proof is in the college enrollment statistics. It took women just 7 years 
after the passage of Title IX to become the majority of the college undergraduate 
population and just 8 years to reach what this thesis defines as the point of 
success. That is, the point when the percentage of the group—whether women or 
African Americans—in the undergraduate population exceeds the percentage of 
said group in the general American population. It took African Americans 34 
years after President John F. Kennedy coined the term “affirmative action” to 
reach this point of success. 
 Therefore, based on the college enrollment data and the explanatory 
variables of public opinion and Supreme Court litigation, this thesis concludes 
that: in-group bias colored the public opinion data and spurred public backlash 
against race-based affirmative action programs in the form of Supreme Court 
litigation, slowing the adoption and success of race-based affirmative action 
programs in comparison with analogous women’s rights initiatives. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
 
 
 
 The Civil Rights and Women’s Rights Movements were two of the 
greatest cultural developments in American history. Each brought about radical 
social change that encompassed the totality of America, instituting 
transformations in the workplace and in the classroom. Though similar in their 
aims, the movements achieved success at different rates, especially in higher 
education. Whereas the Women’s Rights Movement, backed by Title IX 
legislation, was generally well received by the public, the Civil Rights Movement, 
particularly affirmative action programs, faced public resistance. While some of 
this resistance may have stemmed from public confusion surrounding affirmative 
action, as there was no autonomous piece of legislation that enacted affirmative 
action programs, much of it was based on genuine public opposition, which I 
argue was spurred by in-group bias. This led to several Supreme Court cases 
challenging individual affirmative action programs including: Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, Grutter v. Bollinger and most recently Fisher v. 
University of Texas. While there were also numerous federal cases dealing with 
Title IX, most were expansions of the scope of protection under the statute and 
none questioned the need for Title IX enforcement in the academic sector of 
2 
higher education. Based on these findings, this thesis will endeavor to answer the 
following question which has yet to be examined in the field of political science: 
Did in-group bias influence public opinion and public backlash in the form of 
Supreme Court litigation, impacting the time it took for race-based affirmative 
action programs to achieve success in comparison with similar women’s rights 
initiatives? I will attempt to prove that in-group bias has indeed colored the public 
opinion statistics and has prompted Supreme Court litigation against race-based 
affirmative action programs, slowing their adoption and success in relation to 
women’s right initiatives, namely Title IX.  
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Chapter 2 
Historical Context 
  
 
 
 
 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.” 
These words from our Declaration of Independence have become one of the most 
revered phrases in American history. Yet, the United States of America has rarely 
treated all men and women equally. From the ratification of the Constitution on 
June 21, 1788 until the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863, millions 
of African Americans suffered under the imperious rule of slavery. Despite the 
abolition of slavery, this same group continued to suffer from discrimination and 
segregation under the Jim Crow laws and other unjust doctrines through the mid-
twentieth century. Then, in an executive order on March 6, 1961, President John 
F. Kennedy coined the term “affirmative action” as a means to redress the 
pervasive discrimination that persisted in American society. This ushered in the 
era of affirmative action, involving multiple executive orders as well as policies 
like Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which focused on education and jobs 
and ensured that African Americans and other minorities experienced the same 
opportunities as whites.  
 Soon thereafter, with Title IX—a portion of the Education Amendments of 
1972—women were also guaranteed equal opportunity under “any educational 
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program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.” In less than a decade, 
African Americans and women were granted the rights to equal opportunity, 
particularly in higher education. These turning points illustrated a newfound 
American commitment to achieving equality.  
 However, this equality could not come without controversy. Due to public 
backlash against affirmative action programs, this educational principle has been 
continually challenged in cases that have reached the Supreme Court. In 
Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton stated that “the judiciary, from the nature of 
its functions, will always be the least dangerous [branch of government] to the 
political rights of the Constitution.” This has been interpreted to mean that the 
judiciary was presumed to be the weakest branch of the American government. 
But, through the unenumerated power of judicial review, the Supreme Court has 
gained prominence in securing and protecting citizen’s rights. This has been seen 
in numerous affirmative action cases, where the Supreme Court has played a vital 
role in preserving educational opportunities for African Americans. Though the 
Supreme Court has largely backed and enforced affirmative action programs, 
continual challenges to the programs are indicative of the public opposition they 
continue to face.  
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
  
 
 
 
 No official statute enacted what is often referred to as affirmative action, a 
program promulgated as a means to guarantee equality to African Americans, 
specifically in education. Rather, the programs were spawned through a variety of 
edicts at the national, state, and even the individual university level. Affirmative 
action has been debated for nearly five decades by philosophers, legal scholars, 
social scientists, politicians, journalists, editorial writers and common citizens 
(Skrentny 1). Like other contemporary issues in American politics, such as 
abortion and gay marriage, there are two distinct perspectives that never tire of 
defending their positions based on reason or emotion. One faction of the 
population resists affirmative action, saying that it is an “un-American guarantee 
of equal results instead of equal opportunity” that leads to “reverse 
discrimination” (Skrentny 1). Clarence Thomas, the second African American 
justice in Supreme Court history, has vocally supported the theory that affirmative 
action produces equal results rather than equal opportunity. In his new 
autobiography, My Grandfather’s Son, Thomas writes about his law degree from 
Yale University, stating, “I learned the hard way that a law degree from Yale 
meant one thing for white graduates and another for blacks, no matter how much 
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anyone denied it. I'd graduated from one of America's top law schools, but racial 
preference had robbed my achievement of its true value.” This stance is 
juxtaposed against another segment of the American population that supports 
affirmative action programs as “compensation for past injustices, a guarantee of a 
fair share of the economic pie and because it is a civil right, guaranteed by the 
Constitution” (Skrentny 1). These competing public opinions have persisted from 
the onset of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s to the present. Though 
similar in scope, Title IX and the Women’s Rights Movement have not faced 
comparable controversy. This is seen in the difference in support for the programs 
in public opinion polls.  
 But what does public opinion have to do with Supreme Court litigation 
and Congressional legislation? It has long been speculated that the Supreme Court 
and Congress exhibit deference toward public opinion on groundbreaking issues. 
In his book, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle 
for Racial Equality, Michael Klarman seeks to explain the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decisions, from Plessy v. Ferguson to Brown v. Board of Education, by 
referencing public opinion and other political factors rather than legal analysis 
(Keck 601). However, much of this explanation is borrowed from Robert Dahl, 
particularly his 1957 journal article, “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as National Policy Maker.” In this article Dahl asserts that “the 
Supreme Court follows the election returns.” This sentiment is born out of two 
related arguments. First, the Supreme Court lacks the power to enforce its judicial 
decisions. Therefore, the Supreme Court will not succeed in enacting broad social 
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change without support from other institutions—namely the executive and 
legislative branches. Second, the Supreme Court justices are themselves members 
of the national governing coalition and the American public and thus they are 
unlikely to challenge national core commitments unless an issue is ripe for change 
based on public sentiment (Dahl 281).  
 These Dahlian arguments are referenced and expounded upon in a variety 
of journal articles. Kevin T. McGuire and James A. Stimson’s article, “The Least 
Dangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness 
to Public Preferences,” echoes the Dahlian view that the Supreme Court needs 
support in order to enforce their decisions. They argue that, “a Court that requires 
the support of others to give life to its pronouncements must surely work within 
the broad boundaries of public acceptability” (1033). Thus, William Mishler and 
Reginald S. Sheehan, maintain in their article, “Popular Influence on Supreme 
Court Decisions,” that individual Supreme Court justices’ opinions are not “static 
and immutable,” but rather “fluid and dynamic” based on the opinion of the 
public (722). Perhaps this is why Klarman observes that Supreme Court justices 
“rarely hold views that deviate far from dominant public opinion” (6). But what if 
the Supreme Court justices are simply responding to the same forces that 
influence the American public, rather than public opinion. Christopher J. Casillas, 
Peter K. Enns and Patrick C. Wohlfarth, in their article,  “How Public Opinion 
Constrains the U.S. Supreme Court” argue that “the public mood directly 
constrains the justices’ behavior and the Court’s policy outcomes, even after 
controlling for the social forces that influence the public and the Supreme Court” 
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(86). This wealth of scholarly research is part of a revival of Dahlian thinking 
regarding judicial decisions. However, these same sentiments have also been 
applied to the United States Congress.  
  Around the same time that Title IX and rest of the Education Amendments 
of 1972 were being argued in Congress, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes 
authored a paper, entitled “Constituency Influence in Congress,” which suggested 
that Congressional representatives were often influenced by public sentiment, 
especially the public opinion of their constituents (48). Benjamin I. Page and 
Robert Y. Shapiro expanded upon these effects in their journal article “Effect of 
Public Opinion on Policy.” Page and Shapiro present evidence showing that not 
only does public opinion affect policy, it is often the proximate cause of policy. 
Thus, they argue that public opinion has a greater effect on policy than policy has 
on public opinion (Page and Shapiro 189). Perhaps this is why there was no 
federal statute enacting affirmative action—because there was simply not enough 
public support to drive a foundational piece of legislation. Whether or not this is 
true, it seems that—based on these as well as other scholarly articles—
Congressional legislation, like Supreme Court litigation, is significantly 
influenced by public opinion.  
 If public opinion is not caused by policy then it must be influenced by 
other factors. One of those factors is in-group bias. William Sumner, in his 1906 
book Folkways, argued that humans, as a species, naturally join together in 
groups. Furthermore, human social interaction arrangements are often 
characterized by the differentiation and separation into in-groups and out-groups. 
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This division is a demarcation of loyalty and cooperation. Individuals have an 
innate tendency to favor their own group over groups perceived as “others” 
(Sumner 12). As Sumner puts it, “each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, 
boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on 
outsiders” (13). When this classification occurs based on ethnic or cultural 
distinctions, it is called ethnocentrism—a term that Sumner coined. When this 
classification occurs along racial lines it has been called prejudice or racism.  
 In-group bias is something that is often difficult to prevent, as it is tied to 
the subconscious or conscious cataloguing and classification of human beings. 
However, human beings belong to a variety of group categorizations—they have 
many social identities. According to Marilynn Brewer, in her article “Reducing 
Prejudice through Cross-Categorization: Effects of Multiple Social Identities,” if 
humans share a common in-group identity it can reduce the feeling of intergroup 
threat, ultimately quelling the effects of in-group bias (169). Therefore, despite 
the fact that in-group bias subconsciously occurs, it can be limited through a 
separate common in-group identity. Ultimately, in-group bias colors the human 
experience. It impacts an individual’s view of others as well as an individual’s 
view of issues that affect his in-group or another out-group. Thus, as an aggregate, 
it influences public opinion on a national scale. And because public opinion 
influences policymaking or the lack thereof, it can be argued that in-group bias 
has had a profound impact on the differentiation in success of affirmative action 
and Title IX programs.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Method 
  
 
 
 
 This thesis began as an examination of two analogous cultural 
developments in modern American society. Historically, the Civil Rights 
Movement and Women’s Rights Movement have paralleled and supported one 
another. Thurgood Marshall, a renowned civil rights advocate who secured the 
victory as the lawyer in Brown v. Board of Education and went on to become the 
first African American Supreme Court justice, became an advocate for women’s 
rights on the bench. The same can be said for many advocates on either side; 
activists of each movement supported the other. So, it seemed, that these two 
movements would be equally supported and achieve success at similar rates 
during this historical rights revolution in America.  
 But, this was not the case. In examining the quantitative data, namely 
collegiate enrollment data and public opinion surrounding both affirmative action 
and Title IX programs, it became clear that these two cultural phenomenon were 
treated differently and consequently achieved success at different rates. The 
public approached affirmative action programs with skepticism, whereas Title IX 
programs were met with majority support. This slowed the adoption and success 
of affirmative action programs, as seen in the collegiate enrollment data. I chose 
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to focus this thesis on higher education because I believe that education is at the 
heart of social change and therefore an essential element in both the Civil Rights 
and Women’s Rights Movements.  
 After discovering the key difference in public support for affirmative 
action and Title IX programs, I explored the possibilities as to why this 
divergence would occur. Ultimately, I will argue that in-group bias has colored 
the public opinion data. That is, that in-group bias has predisposed the American 
population based on race, causing whites to refuse support for race-based 
affirmative action programs. I will also argue that this psychological phenomenon 
has influenced the public’s reaction to affirmative action programs. Because the 
general population is unable to directly influence affirmative action programs or 
discontinue them, they have moved to hinder them in one of the few ways they 
can—through the courts. This has brought about numerous challenges to 
affirmative action programs, several of which have reached the Supreme Court. 
Though Title IX has also been the cause of several federal cases, most have 
sought to expand support for women under the program and none have questioned 
the need for Title IX enforcement in the academic segment of higher education. 
On the contrary, Supreme Court litigation, spurred by in-group bias, has slowed 
the adoption and success of affirmative action programs. The comparative 
analysis of success for affirmative action programs and Title IX programs can be 
seen in the subsequent discussion of collegiate enrollment statistics.  
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Chapter 5 
Enrollment Statistics 
  
 
 
 
 In the realm of higher education, the ultimate goal of both affirmative 
action and Title IX programs is to increase collegiate enrollment. When John F. 
Kennedy coined the term affirmative action in 1961, African Americans made up 
just 3.4 percent of the undergraduate population at American universities despite 
being 10.5 percent of the general population (U.S. Census Bureau 1961). In 1972, 
when Title IX was enacted, women made up 41.6 percent of the undergraduate 
population at American universities; however, they were also 50.9 percent of the 
American population (U.S. Census Bureau 1972). By 1979, women had surpassed 
men in collegiate enrollment, making up 50.5 percent of the undergraduate 
population at American universities (U.S. Census Bureau 1979). By 1980, the 
percentage of the college population that was female reached 51.6 percent, 
surpassing the percentage of women in the general population, which was 51.0 
percent at the time (U.S. Census Bureau 1980). For the purpose of this thesis, I 
have defined this as the point of success for Title IX—when the percentage of the 
college population that is female exceeded the percentage of women in the 
American population. After the passage of Title IX it took women just eight years 
to make up the 9.3 percent gap between the percentage of women in the general 
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population and the percentage of women in the undergraduate population.  
 The same cannot be said for African Americans. Whereas it took women 
just eight years to make up the gap between the percentage of women in the 
general population and the percentage of women in the college undergraduate 
population, it took African Americans nearly three and a half decades to 
overcome the gap. In 1995, 34 years after John F. Kennedy coined the term 
affirmative action, African Americans made up 12.3 percent of the undergraduate 
population, surpassing the percentage of African Americans in the general 
population, which was 12.1 percent at the time (U.S. Census Bureau 1995). For 
the purpose of this thesis, I have defined this as the point of success for 
affirmative action programs—when the percentage of African Americans in the 
undergraduate population exceeded the percentage of African Americans in the 
general population. While affirmative action programs were ultimately successful 
in boosting the percentage of African Americans in college, it took African 
Americans 34 years to make up the 7.1 percent gap between the percentage of 
African Americans in the general population and the percentage of African 
Americans in the undergraduate population. When juxtaposed against the 
expedited success of Title IX, it is clear that affirmative action achieved adoption 
and success at a significantly slower rate than the analogous women’s rights 
initiative.  
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Chapter 6 
Public Opinion 
  
 
 
 
 In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln described the United States 
government as a “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” 
This seems to fit with the contemporary political narrative in which Congress, the 
President and the Supreme Court are all cited as showing deference to public 
opinion. Simply stated, public opinion is the aggregate of individual’s beliefs and 
attitudes surrounding an issue. This definition is similar to that of George Gallup, 
a pioneer in the areas of survey sampling and polling, who defined public opinion 
as “an aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters that affect or interest 
the community”  (Gallup 1958). In the United States, national public opinion data 
can offer a powerful statement regarding controversial issues from gay marriage 
to abortion to affirmative action.  
 But what is affirmative action? One key issue that influences public 
opinion is in defining the term. Affirmative action can be broadly read to include 
any policies that take steps to promote equality for specific groups, though it is 
primarily used in describing policies benefitting African Americans. As a general 
term, affirmative action encompasses more than just the “quotas” or “preferences” 
for which the program has largely become known (Steech & Krysan 129). The 
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term also refers to “open recruiting procedures, efforts to monitor progress in 
hiring and promoting underrepresented groups, contracts set-aside for minorities 
and other proactive policies” (Graham 53). Based on these different definitions of 
the term affirmative action, it is “likely that people have difficulty figuring out 
what they are being asked” when poll questions are phrased in an abstract manner 
(Steech & Krysan 129). However, most polling data centers around two specific 
framings of the term affirmative action—preferences and quotas.   
 When the public is questioned regarding affirmative action as a general 
racial preference for African Americans, the results have been relatively steady. 
In Times Mirror polls from 1987 through 1994, those who agreed with 
preferential treatment for African Americans ranged from 24 to 34 percent. 
Among the white population this percentage ranged from 17 to 29 percent; 
whereas, among the black population it ranged from 62 to 70 percent (Times 
Mirror 1987-1994). However, in Gallup polls from 1977 to 1991, those who 
believed that ability alone should determine who is admitted to college or gets a 
job was steadily between 81 and 84 percent. Support for preferential treatment for 
minorities, when framed in competition with ability as a determining factor, was 
just 10 percent (Gallup 1977-1991). This is a major discrepancy from the Times 
Mirror polls, simply based on the framing of the question. There has been greater 
support for preferential affirmative action programs when the program is 
specifically described, rather than broadly cast as “affirmative action” or as 
generally “preferential.” Preference in hiring and promotion for African 
Americans has been supported by as much as 47 percent of the population in CBS 
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and New York Times polls that mention prior discrimination against blacks (CBS 
News and New York Times 1985-1995). However, even in these situations, the 
framing of the question can drastically influence results. In National Election 
Studies and General Social Survey questions, which mention that some scholars 
argue that “preference in hiring and promotion of Blacks is wrong because it 
gives Blacks advantages they haven’t earned,” as little as 15 percent of the 
population supported preferential programs similar to those described in the 
Times Mirror, CBS and New York Times polls (NES, GSS 1986-1994). No 
matter how the question is framed, affirmative action programs described as 
preferential have not received a majority of support from the American public.  
 However, when affirmative action programs are framed as having no rigid 
quotas, they have gained significantly more public backing. In Harris polls which 
ask: “Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs in higher education for 
blacks provided there are no rigid quotas?” the programs have been supported by 
68 to 76 percent of the population (Harris 1978-1982). However, in National 
Election Studies that mention past discrimination and ask if the person is “for or 
against quotas to admit black students,” public support for quotas ranges from 33 
to 38 percent. Among whites, those in favor of quotas to admit black students fell 
between 26 and 31 percent of the population; whereas these same quotas were 
supported by as much as 83 percent of the African American population (NES 
1986-1992). Based on the divergent results depending on if the question is framed 
as a preference or a racial quota, it seems as though the framing of the question is 
just as important, if not more important, than the content of the question in 
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determining public opinion poll results.  
 Though public opinion data paints an interesting picture of support, or lack 
thereof, for affirmative action, it is not without limitations. Currently, public 
opinion is readily captured in National Election Day exit polls; however, this 
practice did not start until the early 1970s. Therefore, in studying affirmative 
action, a program that began in the mid-1960s, one must overcome the obstacle of 
spottiness in the survey record. There is little information available regarding 
what public opinion toward affirmative action was in the late 1960s and early 
1970s when the programs were first instituted (Steech & Krysan 128). It was not 
until the mid-1980s that “systematic attempts to trace trends” on the issue were 
made (Steech & Krysan 129). One reason for heightened awareness to affirmative 
action trends and more consistent and conscious polling was that politicians, at 
the time, began to see affirmative action as an issue that could win them votes 
(Swain 329). Because it was enacted a decade after the onset of affirmative 
action, public opinion data regarding Title IX does not face as much spottiness in 
the survey record.   
 Beginning with its passage in the 1970s, Title IX has generally been met 
with public support. In Harris polls regarding racial and religious minorities and 
women from 1972-1985, the percentage of the population in favor of Title IX 
ranged from 62 to 71 percent. When Title IX achieved success in 1980—when the 
percentage of the college population that was female exceeded the percentage of 
women in the American population—64 percent of the general public supported 
Title IX programs (Harris 1972-1985). In recent years, after the positive effects of 
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Title IX have been clearly seen, support for the programs has grown. In a 2000 
poll, conducted by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, 79 percent of the 
American population approved of Title IX when described as “a prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of gender” (NBC News & Wall Street Journal 2000). 
In a similar poll taken in 2003, 68 percent of the population approved of Title IX 
(NBC News & Wall Street Journal 2003). That same year, in a Gallup, CNN and 
USA Today poll, 61 percent of the population said that Title IX has had a “mostly 
positive overall impact” (Gallup, CNN & USA Today 2003). In 2012, on the 40
th
 
anniversary of the passage of Title IX, 78 percent of the American population 
agreed that Title IX’s impact has been mostly positive (CBS News & NY Times 
2012). In comparison with race-base affirmative action programs, there has been 
less breadth in public opinion polling regarding Title IX. I postulate that this may 
be due to the fact that Title IX is a slightly less contentious issue in the political 
sphere and in the public eye, based on the results of historical public opinion 
polls. Though there have not been as many polls dealing with Title IX when 
compared to race-based affirmative action, the public’s support for Title IX 
programs and appreciation of their positive impact has been clearly seen in public 
opinion data.  
 Even when dealing with the more controversial issue of gender-based 
affirmative action, the public has shown significant support. In a 1978 Harris poll 
that asked, “Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs in higher 
education for women provided there are no rigid quotas?” 90 percent of the 
African American population and 70 percent of the white population responded in 
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favor of gender-based affirmative action. In Harris surveys that utilized the same 
question framing from 1982-1991, public support for gender-based affirmative 
action ranged from 75 to 78 percent. However, in more recent years—as women 
have surpassed men not only in undergraduate collegiate enrollment, but also in 
undergraduate and advanced college degrees earned—support for gender-based 
affirmative action has waned. In a 1995 Los Angeles Times poll, 61 percent of the 
population was in favor of “affirmative action programs designed to help women 
get better jobs and education” (LA Times 1995). In Gallup polls from 1995-2005, 
support for gender-based affirmative action programs ranged from 56 to 59 
percent (Gallup 1995-2005). Finally, in a 2009 poll that asked if respondents 
“generally favored or opposed affirmative action programs for women,” 63 
percent of the population responded in favor of gender-based affirmative action 
programs (AP 2009). Based on the public opinion data—despite the fact that 
women have become the majority in collegiate enrollment and have begun to earn 
the majority of undergraduate and advanced college degrees—the majority of the 
American population still supports gender-based affirmative action. Therefore, 
whether dealing with a prohibition of discrimination based on gender, like Title 
IX, or a program that provides preferential treatment, like gender-based 
affirmative action, the majority American public responds favorably. On the 
contrary, even at the height of support for race-based affirmative action, a 
program described as generally preferential based on race or as utilizing a race-
based quota never received majority support from the American public.  
 Even the order of questioning is important when comparing race-based 
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and gender-based affirmative action programs. In a 2003 Gallup poll, respondents 
were asked whether they favored or opposed affirmative action programs for 
women and racial minorities. Respondents who were first asked about affirmative 
action for women favored it 62 percent of the time. Meanwhile, those who were 
asked the same question after a similar question about racial minorities favored it 
just 56 percent of the time (Gallup 2003). A reverse pattern is evident when 
examining the questions regarding racial minorities. Respondents who were first 
asked about affirmative action for racial minorities opposed it 48 percent of the 
time, while favoring it just 45 percent of the time. On the contrary, those who 
were asked the same question after a similar question about women favored it 53 
percent of the time, while opposing it just 38 percent of the time (Gallup 2003). 
This poll illustrates that Americans are clearly more likely to support affirmative 
programs for women than affirmative action programs for racial minorities.  
 But, question order and comparative context matter. When the discussion 
of affirmative action focuses only on racial minorities then public support for 
these programs is nearly evenly divided—leaning slightly against rather than in 
favor. Similarly, if the focus is solely on Title IX programs or gender-based 
affirmative action programs for women then public support is quite substantial.  
 However, if the context of the debate is framed around affirmative action 
programs for both women and racial minorities, some people attempt to be 
consistent. Their support or opposition for one of the programs sways their 
answers. They may choose to support the program for minorities because they 
support it for women, or they may oppose the program for women because they 
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oppose it for minorities. This comparative context is what causes such divergent 
responses based on question order (Gallup 2003). When the respondents are 
broken down by race and gender, the data shows that women and African 
Americans are consistent in their level of support for affirmative action programs 
for women and for racial minorities. Therefore, only responses of white men are 
affected by question order. Still, based on the disparities in responses to public 
opinion questions regarding affirmative action, it seems likely that women—as 
well as African American men—may change their stance on the program in 
certain situations.  
 While some of the difference in responses to affirmative action questions 
can be blamed on the lack of an autonomous piece of congressional legislation 
enacting the program, it is unlikely the sole cause. The inconsistency of responses 
reflects more than unconscious public confusion due to lack of understanding of 
the programs or the framing of the question. In each of the affirmative action polls 
stratified by race, African American support for race-based affirmative action has 
often doubled and occasionally tripled white support for the programs, depending 
on the question’s framing. Therefore, while framing is an important issue that 
may influence public support for race-based affirmative action programs, it seems 
more likely that the disparities can be explained by the biases at play.  
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Chapter 7 
In-Group Bias 
  
 
 
 
 Why is the public’s opinion of two seemingly similar programs so 
different? I argue that the explanation may lie in social psychology; namely, in the 
work of William Sumner. His theory has developed and been identified under 
several nomenclatures: intergroup bias, in-group favoritism, in-group out-group 
bias and in-group bias. For the purposes of this thesis, this sociological 
phenomenon will be referred to as in-group bias. The study of in-group bias has 
been used to explicate several cultural developments including ethnocentrism, 
prejudice and racism.  
 Individuals are rarely in a position to directly impact an entire social 
group. However, they are free to develop social policy attitudes that they expect 
will influence in-group and out-group outcomes. Because of this, a large body of 
research has centered on evaluating individuals’ policy preferences as a way of 
examining various intergroup conflicts (Goff, Lowery, Knowles & Unzueta 961). 
One of the most commonly studied policies is that of affirmative action. Despite 
widespread support for the egalitarian ideals that inspired affirmative action, the 
policy has been met with considerable resistance from whites (Sears, Henry, & 
Kosterman 79). This is reflected in the stratification of support for affirmative 
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action in public opinion polls along racial lines.  
 Depending on the poll, white support for race-based affirmative action 
ranges from 15 to 30 percent. Meanwhile, African American support for the 
programs varies between 60 and 85 percent. The majority of each racial group is 
operating from the framework of an in-group bias based on their support or lack 
of support for affirmative action programs.  
 Unlike race-based affirmative action programs, Title IX and even gender-
based affirmative action programs have been met with relative support from the 
general American public. I argue that this occurs because the majority of the 
American public subconsciously views women as part of their in-group, due to a 
common in-group identity beyond gender. In-group bias stems from a perceived 
intergroup threat. This is based in Realistic Conflict Theory which proposes that 
when two groups are in competition with one another over scarce resources—like 
places in a collegiate undergraduate class—the potential success of one group 
threatens the well-being of the other (Sherif & Sherif 232). However, a common 
in-group identity will reduce the perceived threat between groups. In fact, when a 
common in-group identity is formed, it can create a perception of cooperation and 
shared fate (Brewer 167). I believe this has increased the nexus between women 
and males of both races.  
 Naturally, all women are part of the in-group who benefit from Title IX 
and gender-based affirmative action. But what is really interesting is that men 
seem to form a common in-group identity with women, based on their responses 
to questions regarding Title IX and gender-based affirmative action. As was 
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previously established, white men are the only ones who change their views of 
affirmative action programs based on if the debate begins speaking about women 
or racial minorities (Gallup 2003). They attempt to aid women, whom they 
categorically view as their own mothers, sisters and daughters—unless it is 
correlated with aiding African Americans and other racial minorities. This is 
illustrative of a perception of women as part of the “white” in-group. The same 
can be said for African American males, who likely view women as part of the 
“black” in-group for similar reasons. Therefore, it seems as though gender 
differences, whether dealing with Title IX or gender-based affirmative action 
programs, do not trigger the out-group negativity that racial differences do. This 
type of stratification along racial, but not gender, lines explains the significant 
differences in public opinion relating to race-based affirmative action versus Title 
IX and gender-based affirmative action. Because the Supreme Court often 
exhibits deference toward public opinion, it also begins to explain the differences 
in Supreme Court litigation and Supreme Court rulings regarding gender-based 
affirmative action and similar women’s rights initiatives.  
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Chapter 8 
Public Opinion and the Supreme Court 
  
 
 
 
 The Supreme Court follows the election returns. This simple statement, 
initially purported by Robert Dahl, has influenced the analysis of the Supreme 
Court over the past half-century. Many scholars have used it to explicate the 
Court’s opinions—especially those on controversial issues. Few issues have been 
as contentious, or as noteworthy, as affirmative action. Thus, the Court has shown 
significant deference to public opinion in dealing with affirmative action cases. In 
a 1977 Roper poll, just 25 percent of the American public supported keeping 
quotas in college admissions “to insure a certain number of minority students” 
(Roper 1977). Just a year later, in the landmark Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke case, the Supreme Court ruled that utilizing a quota system 
based on race in the collegiate admissions process was unconstitutional. However, 
in that same case, the Supreme Court held that affirmative action programs were 
constitutional, reflective of the 68 percent of the public who were in favor of 
affirmative action programs with “no rigid quotas” at the time (Harris 1978). By 
2003, when the Supreme Court again ruled on affirmative action in the Grutter v. 
Bollinger case, the public was considerably divided on the issue of affirmative 
action. This was reflected in the Court’s divisive 5-4 decision, which produced 
27 
strong written opinions both in concurrence and dissent. Finally, though the Court 
has yet to rule in the Fisher v. University of Texas case, based on the lack of 
public support for affirmative action in recent years, it would seem likely that the 
Court would rule for Fisher, limiting or effectively ending affirmative action.  
 The Supreme Court has shown similar deference to public opinion in 
women’s rights cases. Because the public has generally supported Title IX, there 
have been few challenges to the statute at the Supreme Court level. However, the 
one significant limitation to Title IX came in the Grove City College v. Bell case, 
decided in 1984. This limitation, however brief—it was abrogated by the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1988—was reflective of a slight decline in support for 
Title IX programs after women became the majority of the college undergraduate 
population in 1979. Yet, even at this juncture, 65 percent of the general public 
still supported Title IX programs (Harris 1979). There have been several other 
noteworthy women’s rights cases dealing with the more contentious issue of 
gender-based affirmative action. However, in both the 1976 case Craig v. Boren 
and the 1979 case Califano v. Webster, the Supreme Court has distinguished 
gender-based affirmative action from race-based affirmative action and has 
rendered support for gender-based affirmative action programs. This distinction is 
reflective of the disparity in public opinion regarding the two programs during 
this era. While remedial race-based affirmative action programs did not muster 
majority support in the late 1970s, gender-based affirmative action was supported 
by 90 percent of the African American population and 70 percent of the white 
population at that time (Harris 1978). Thus, it seems as though public opinion—
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colored by in-group bias—has spurred Supreme Court litigation and influenced 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in dealing with affirmative action and similar 
women’s rights initiatives.  
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Chapter 9 
Race-Based Affirmative Action Cases 
  
 
 
 
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger is the most recent 
constitutional interpretation in the ongoing debate over affirmative action. In this 
2003 case, Barbara Grutter, a Caucasian female Michigan resident, argued that the 
University of Michigan Law School had discriminated against her on the basis of 
race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment, among 
other statutes. She believed that she had been rejected, despite her 3.8 GPA and 
161 LSAT score, because the law school utilizes race as a “predominant factor” in 
its admissions process. According to Grutter, this gave applicants belonging to 
certain minority groups a significantly greater opportunity for admission than 
those of disfavored racial groups; however, the school argued that it was a 
compelling state interest for it to achieve a “critical mass” of minority students. 
The Court ruled, 5-4, in favor of the University of Michigan Law School, relying 
largely on precedent from the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
case. On the other hand, vocal dissenters relied on United States v. Virginia as 
precedential evidence. The differing views on the application of affirmative action 
inspired the written opinions of the court in the Grutter v. Bollinger case.  
 The majority in Grutter v. Bollinger utilized precedent from the Regents of 
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the University of California v. Bakke case in their written opinion. The ruling, 
authored by Sandra Day O’Connor, states that the University of Michigan Law 
School’s policy aspires to “achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich 
everyone’s education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of 
its parts.” This seems like a reasonable argument, but the question at hand largely 
related to the Court’s decision in Bakke. In the majority opinion, O’Connor asserts 
that Justice Powell’s concurrence in Bakke has become the Court’s standard for 
constitutional analysis of “race-conscious admissions policies.” The Court held 
that the law school's interest in obtaining a “critical mass” of minority students 
was indeed a “narrowly tailored” use of race and was therefore constitutional. 
However, O’Connor recognized that affirmative action should still be a temporary 
measure and argued that at some time in the future it would be unnecessary to 
ensure diversity. At that point in time, she argues, a “colorblind” policy should be 
implemented.  
 On the other hand, the dissenters in Grutter v. Bollinger argue that 
affirmative action is illegal now—in this case. The dissent, authored by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and joined by justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, maintained 
that the University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy was 
unconstitutional and that it attempted to achieve an inconsistent racial balancing. 
This is in direct opposition with the idea of a “critical mass” presented by the 
majority. Rehnquist cited admissions statistics in his dissent, demonstrating that 
the admissions practices differed dramatically from year to year and from one 
race to another. As the data shows, there is a correlation between the law school’s 
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pool of applicants of the minority groups and the percentage of admitted students 
that is “far too precise to be dismissed as merely the result of the school paying 
some attention to the numbers.”  
 Justice Thomas, the only African American on the Court at the time of 
Grutter v. Bollinger decision, also issued his own scathing opinion, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. Thomas begins his opinion by quoting Frederick 
Douglass, one of the most prominent abolitionists of the 19
th
 century. Douglass 
stated that what the African American people needed was “not benevolence, not 
pity, not sympathy, but simply justice.” He goes on to articulate that nothing 
should be done for African Americans; rather, they should be allowed to stand on 
their own legs—“if they fall, let them fall.” Thomas echoes this sentiment in his 
opinion. He argues that the University of Michigan Law School’s policy is not 
only unconstitutional, but that it also constitutes racial discrimination. According 
to Thomas, law schools necessitate this type of discriminatory policy by creating 
“elitist” admissions standards. “The Law School, of its own choosing, and for its 
own purposes, maintains an exclusionary admissions system that it knows 
produces racially disproportionate results.” Thomas then asserts that there is no 
compelling state interest in Michigan maintaining an elite law school—or even a 
law school at all—as a number of state schools do not have law schools, let alone 
law schools that would rank among the nation’s elite.   
 Therefore, the University of Michigan Law School should be “forced to 
choose between its classroom aesthetic and its exclusionary admissions system.” 
Thomas bases this argument on a precedent set in the United States v. Virginia 
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case. In this case the Court struck down the Virginia Military Institute’s male-
only admission policy in a 7-1 decision. Thomas recused himself from that case, 
likely because his son was enrolled at the institute at the time. However, he 
utilizes it as precedential evidence here, showing that the Court has previously 
forced institutions to drastically alter their admissions processes and the character 
of the institutions themselves. Finally, Thomas challenges the assertion that the 
University of Michigan Law School cannot achieve the diversity it desires 
without a preferential admissions policy. He cites the University of California, 
Berkeley School of Law as an example of an institution with a “reputation for 
excellence” rivaling Michigan that has achieved a diverse student body without 
“resorting to racial discrimination.” Though Thomas sympathizes with the 
majority’s attempt to aid African American students, he utilizes precedential 
evidence and contemporary examples to rule out preferential admissions policies 
as a constitutional means to achieve a diverse student body.  
 The Grutter v. Bollinger case centers on a controversial constitutional 
principle—the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment. This clause, 
which states that no state shall “deny to any person in its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws,” has largely been recognized as an endeavor to assure that 
the United States adheres to its professed commitment to the “proposition that all 
men are created equal.” The clause has been referenced in many landmark 
Supreme Court decisions, none more infamous than the ruling in Brown v. Board 
of Education. In this case, the Court ruled unanimously that the segregation of 
students in public schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14
th
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Amendment, because separate facilities are inherently unequal. Similarly, when 
the Court held that racial quota systems were unconstitutional, in 1978 case of 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the majority relied upon the 
Equal Protection Clause for justification. However, by 2003, when the Court ruled 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, there was significant dissent regarding whether or not 
affirmative action and generally preferential admissions principles were in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The majority followed the prior ruling in 
Bakke, arguing that affirmative action is constitutional as long as its use is 
narrowly tailored and not utilized to achieve a racial quota. However, the majority 
recognized that affirmative action was to be a temporary measure and that 
sometime in the future it would be unnecessary to achieve diversity in admissions. 
The dissenters, on the other hand, argued that affirmative action was 
unconstitutional then and there, and that its result was, in effect, racial 
discrimination. These divergent viewpoints illuminate the uncertainty surrounding 
the constitutionality of affirmative action programs, especially in recent years.  
 In general, affirmative action programs can be seen as a progressive 
unfolding of constitutional principles. Despite their linkage to the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment, affirmative action cases pose a difficult 
issue when referencing the Constitution from an originalist perspective. The 
Constitution mentions nothing regarding affirmative action or preferential 
treatment based on race. However, it seems implausible to argue that the 
Reconstruction Era Congress intended for the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit 
racial classifications and preferential programs based on race. In fact, that same 
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Congress promoted racial integration as a goal and deployed race-conscious 
measures to achieve it (Lemieux 2). They provided special payments to African 
American soldiers to ensure they were compensated for their service to the Union, 
passed numerous race-conscious antipoverty measures and most notably created 
the Freedman’s Bureau to aid former slaves by funding school construction and 
education programs, among other necessities (Lemieux 2). Neither of the Court’s 
originalist thinkers, Scalia nor Thomas, has attempted to argue that the 
Reconstruction Era Congress intended for the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit 
race-conscious programs. Rather, each “speaks in abstract terms about the 
principle of color blindness” (Lemieux 2). Because there is no tangible historical 
meaning surrounding affirmative action, as it goes unmentioned in the 
Constitution, originalists are left without a concrete answer.  
 However, most scholars have argued that an originalist interpretation of 
the 14
th
 Amendment would lead the Court to uphold race-conscious affirmative 
action—a view that neither Scalia or Thomas seem to hold or support. Therefore, 
Scalia and Thomas have largely relied on policy arguments when dealing with 
race-conscious programs. Some justices, like O’Connor, argue that the Court 
should still follow the example of the Reconstruction Era Congress, utilizing race-
conscious programs as that Congress did. However, others, like Scalia and 
Thomas, argue that, race-conscious programs should be considered 
unconstitutional racial discrimination from this point forward. This is seen in 
Thomas’ written opinion, joined by Scalia, in Grutter v. Bollinger. Thomas 
concurs with O’Connor’s famous statement in which she argues that affirmative 
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action will no longer be necessary to achieve racial equality 25 years from the 
decision; stating, “I agree with the Court's holding that racial discrimination in 
higher education admissions will be illegal in 25 years.” However, Thomas and 
Scalia dissent from the remainder of the Court’s opinion because they believe 
that, “the Law School's current use of race violates the Equal Protection Clause” 
and that “the Constitution means the same thing today as it will in 300 months.” 
Each of these camps supposedly relies on the perspective of the Reconstruction 
Era Congress; yet each arrives at a divergent endpoint, as seen in their 
interpretation and opinions in race-based affirmative action cases.  
 But why is there such a controversy surrounding affirmative action—why 
does all of this matter? As time has passed affirmative action and race-conscious 
programs have become more and more controversial. Since its unanimous 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education the Court’s position on race-
consciousness has gradually shifted, first to placing limitations on affirmative 
action programs, and then to vocal dissent regarding the constitutionality of 
affirmative action as a whole. Seemingly the next step in the process would be the 
prohibition of race-conscious programs altogether. This type of “colorblind” 
principle is something that O’Connor addressed in the majority opinion in Grutter 
v. Bollinger. She argued that affirmative action should not be granted permanent 
status and that 25 years from the decision, or around 2028, preferential treatment 
would no longer be necessary to create equality amongst the races. Thomas 
argued that this level of equality had been reached and that preferential treatment 
was unnecessary then—in 2003—rather than 25 years from that date as O’Connor 
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suggested. Though Thomas did not get his wish in 2003, the Court may abolish 
preferential treatment based on race sooner than O’Connor thought.  
 The Supreme Court has heard another major case dealing with the use of 
race in undergraduate admissions decisions, this time at the University of Texas. 
This case, Fisher v. University of Texas, was brought by Abigail Fisher; a white 
student who says the university denied her admittance because of her race. In 
Texas, the top 10 percent each of high school’s graduating class is automatically 
admitted to the state’s public university system. Though this policy does not 
consider race, it does increase racial diversity at the university level. Fisher 
missed this cutoff and was entered into a secondary pool of applicants who can be 
admitted through a program that utilizes race as a factor. Fisher argues that the 
University of Texas cannot “have it both ways” (Liptak 1). Because they have 
implemented a race-neutral program to increase minority admissions, she asserts, 
they cannot supplement it with a race-conscious program.  
 The lower federal courts ruled in favor of the university, arguing that the 
University of Texas’ admissions program met the standards laid out in Grutter v. 
Bollinger. According to a Fifth Circuit panel of judges, the university recognized 
that “a quota system would not survive judicial review” and the school “took care 
to avoid this fatal mistake.” In fact, the University of Texas’ system was modeled 
after the Grutter program, which the Supreme Court held was not a quota. The 
panel points out that the University of Texas, “has never established a specific 
number, percentage, or range of minority enrollment that would constitute 
“critical mass,” nor does it award any fixed number of points to minority students 
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in a way that impermissibly values race for its own sake.” Rather, the University 
of Texas’ program, like the one outlined in Grutter pursues the “twin objectives 
of rewarding academic merit and fostering diversity.” The Fifth Circuit panel 
argues that these can be “complementary rather than competing” objectives, as 
“students rising to the top of under-represented groups demonstrate promise as 
future leaders.” According to the Fifth Circuit panel, “these students’ relative 
success in the face of harmful and widespread stereotypes evidences a degree of 
drive, determination, and merit not captured by test scores alone.” Thus, the race-
conscious program—which supplements the University of Texas’ race-neutral 
admissions program—is constitutional, as it follows the precedential standards 
established in Grutter v. Bollinger. Though the lower courts have ruled in favor of 
the university, should the Supreme Court choose to rule for Fisher, this case has 
the potential to “eliminate diversity as a rationale sufficient to justify any use of 
race in admissions decisions—the rationale the Court endorsed in the Grutter v. 
Bollinger decision” (Liptak 2). Though the Supreme Court has not yet ruled in the 
Fisher v. University of Texas case many, including famed Supreme Court reporter 
Jeffrey Toobin, have predicted that the Court will effectively end affirmative 
action with its ruling on the case.  
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Chapter 10 
Title IX Cases 
  
 
 
 
 While affirmative action has faced significant challenges in the Supreme 
Court through cases like Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Grutter 
v. Bollinger and mostly recently Fisher v. University of Texas, Title IX has been 
relatively unopposed in the realm of higher education. Most Title IX cases have 
sought to expand support for women under the program. In the 1979 case Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, the Supreme Court ruled that individuals could sue 
under Title IX. Though this was not explicitly stated in the statute, this expansion 
allowed for an individual remedy to coincide with the potential termination of 
federal funds for Title IX violations.  
 Many subsequent cases utilized this opportunity to sue under Title IX, 
especially regarding issues of sexual harassment. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County 
Public School, a 1992 case, the Supreme Court held that Title IX supports a claim 
for monetary damages in sexual harassment cases between a female student and a 
teacher. In Doe v. Petaluma Unified School District, a Ninth Circuit case in 1995, 
Title IX’s coverage was expanded to cases of student-on-student sexual 
harassment. Through the 1999 case, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 
the Supreme Court indoctrinated this into federal law. In ruling, the Supreme 
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Court held that a school district is liable for student-on-student harassment if it is 
aware of the problem and acts with “deliberate indifference” rather than trying to 
resolve it. This case echoed the “deliberate indifference” standard established in 
the 1998 case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District. That case dealt 
with liability for damages when a teacher harasses a student. In Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District, the Supreme Court ruled that a school is liable 
for damages when a school official with knowledge of the teacher’s harassment 
and the authority to take action acts with “deliberate indifference” to the conduct. 
Thus, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education was merely an expansion of 
school liability to include student-on-student sexual harassment as well as the 
aforementioned teacher-on-student sexual harassment. While many of the cases 
filed under Title IX have expanded the scope of the statute, a few legitimate 
challenges have been rendered against it.  
 However, most of the cases confronting Title IX have centered on athletics 
rather than academics. In 1997, the Supreme Court declined to review a First 
Circuit case that upheld the use of the Three-Prong Effective Accommodation 
Test for Title IX compliance. In this case, Cohen v. Brown University, the First 
Circuit upheld that schools must show athletic opportunities that are proportionate 
with male and female enrollment levels, show a history of increasing 
opportunities for the underrepresented sex, or show that they are fulfilling the 
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. Though a cert denial 
technically does not indicate the Supreme Court’s views on an issue, by denying 
Brown’s petition for cert, the Supreme Court allowed the First Circuit ruling to 
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stand—effectively supporting Title IX—even in the more controversial realm of 
athletics. This was seen again in the 2004 case, National Wrestling Coaches 
Association v. United States Department of Education. In that case, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of 
the claim that men’s sports teams are discriminated against because of Title IX. 
Consequently, even in relation to collegiate athletics the Supreme Court and other 
federal courts have rendered support for Title IX.  
 In more recent cases, women have utilized Title IX to challenge for equal 
opportunity in collegiate athletic departments. In Mansourian v. Board of Regents 
of the University of California at Davis, a 2010 case out of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California, a group of female wrestlers 
challenged U.C. Davis’s decision to cut them from the previously coed wrestling 
team. The court found in favor of the female wrestlers, arguing that the University 
had not provided equal athletic opportunity to female athletes. A similar case was 
recently decided in the Second Circuit. The case, Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
University, centered around Quinnipiac’s decision to cut its women’s volleyball 
program as well as its men’s golf and outdoor track and field teams. The 
elimination of these sports would theoretically allow Quinnipiac to create a new 
varsity sports team, women’s competitive cheerleading. Stephanie Biediger and 
other members of the women’s volleyball team filed suit against Quinnipiac, 
arguing that even with the competitive cheerleading team Quinnipiac had a 
disproportionate number of male athletes. Females make up 61.87 percent of the 
Quinnipiac University student body but are afforded only 58.25 percent of the 
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varsity athletic participation opportunities. The Second Circuit upheld the District 
Court’s decision that this 3.62 percent disparity was enough to constitute a Title 
IX violation. Consequently, Quinnipiac was forced to reinstate the women’s 
volleyball program. The vast majority of Title IX cases have either expanded the 
scope of support for women under the statute or have protected women’s rights 
under the statute. However, the Supreme Court did render one significant 
limitation on Title IX through the 1984 case, Grove City College v. Bell. The case 
initially looks like another clear expansion of Title IX, as the Court held that Title 
IX could be applied to private schools that refused direct federal funding but 
where a large number of students received financial aid or federally funded 
scholarships. However, the decision goes on to narrowly interpret Title IX, 
constraining its protections to the departments that actually receive federal 
funding—essentially the school’s financial aid department—rather than applying 
the statute to the institution as a whole. This ruling significantly impacted Title IX 
enforcement in collegiate athletics as it virtually immunizes athletic programs 
from Title IX scrutiny because they rarely receive direct federal funding. On the 
other hand, this Title IX limitation did not have much of an impact on the 
academic sector; in fact, it served as a means to expand Title IX implementation 
into private schools. This decision was later abrogated by the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1988, which stated that recipients of federal funding must 
comply with civil rights laws as an entire institution, not just in the particular 
department, program or activity that is receiving federal funding. This legislative 
act paved the way for many of the aforementioned Title IX cases dealing with 
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collegiate athletics. Though there have been many federal cases dealing with Title 
IX, most have been expansions of the scope of the statute or have dealt with Title 
IX enforcement in athletics. Even in its narrowest interpretation of Title IX, in the 
Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court has recognized and supported the 
need for Title IX enforcement in the academic sector of higher education.  
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Chapter 11 
Competing Explanation: Gender-Based Affirmative Action 
  
 
 
 
 While Title IX and race-based affirmative action are similar programs, 
they are not completely analogous. In its simplest form, Title IX is a policy that 
guarantees non-discrimination for women. Race-based affirmative action, on the 
other hand, is a policy that provides preferential treatment—whether in collegiate 
admissions or the hiring process—for African Americans. However, after the 
passage of Title IX, gender-based affirmative action programs, which provide 
preferential treatment to women, were also instituted. As seen in the prior 
discussion of public opinion, Americans tend to support gender-based affirmative 
action more than race-based affirmative action—albeit by a smaller margin than 
between affirmative action and Title IX programs.   
 Though Title IX and gender-based affirmative action programs are closely 
linked, they have a different history of support, not only in the public, but also in 
the Supreme Court. Whereas there have been few legitimate challenges to Title 
IX, the Supreme Court has heard numerous other women’s rights cases including 
cases dealing with gender-based affirmative action. One of the most significant 
cases for women’s rights was handed down a year prior to the passage of Title IX. 
In Reed v. Reed, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the Equal 
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Protection Clause of the 14
th
 Amendment applied to differential treatment based 
on gender. 
 In ruling on Equal Protection cases, the Supreme Court has established 
three distinct levels of scrutiny. The default level of review is rational basis 
scrutiny. Under a rational basis analysis, a law is constitutional as long as it is 
“reasonably related” to a “legitimate government interest.” If the Equal Protection 
case deals with a “quasi-suspect class” then the Supreme Court will utilize the 
intermediate scrutiny standard. In these cases, a law is unconstitutional unless it is 
“substantially related” to an “important government interest.” Finally, if the Equal 
Protection case deals with a “suspect class” then the Supreme Court will employ 
the strict scrutiny standard. In these cases, a law is unconstitutional unless it is 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a  
“compelling government interest.” Additionally, in cases that arouse strict 
scrutiny, there must not be a “less restrictive means” for achieving that interest. 
Since Korematsu v. United States, the 1944 case dealing with the internment of 
Japanese Americans during World War II, race has been labeled as a suspect class 
in the eyes of the Supreme Court. Therefore, any Equal Protection case dealing 
with racial discrimination triggers the strict scrutiny standard. But to what 
standard does the Supreme Court hold gender-based discrimination?  
 In the 1973 case, Frontiero v. Richardson, a plurality of the Court used a 
strict scrutiny standard in deciding that benefits given by the United States 
military to service member’s families cannot be allocated differently based on 
gender. In arguing for strict scrutiny, the Court focused on the history of gender-
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based discrimination in America. In the plurality opinion, the Court states that, 
“There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of 
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an 
attitude of “romantic paternalism” which, in practical effect, put women, not on a 
pedestal, but in a cage.” This paternalistic view allowed the laws of the United 
States to “gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between 
the sexes.” In fact, the Court argues that, for much of the 19th century, “the 
position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of 
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could hold 
office, serve on juries, or bring suit in their own names, and married women 
traditionally were denied the legal capacity to hold or convey property or to serve 
as legal guardians of their own children.” The Court also acknowledges that 
gender, like race and national origin—the two prior suspect classes, is an 
“immutable characteristic determined solely by accident of birth” and that, like 
those classes, it “frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society.” This line of argumentation seems to link race and gender together under 
the strict scrutiny standard of Equal Protection.  
 However, the strict scrutiny standard, utilized by the Court in Frontiero v. 
Richardson, was not employed in subsequent cases regarding gender 
discrimination. In fact, just three years later, in the 1976 case Craig v. Boren, the 
Supreme Court instituted the standard of intermediate scrutiny in dealing with 
distinctions based on gender. Thus, to uphold race-based discrimination the 
government must still provide a compelling interest justification and narrowly 
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tailored means. In contrast, after the decision in Craig v. Boren, gender-based 
classifications require only that the law be substantially related to an important 
government interest. This minor distinction had significant ramifications for 
gender-based affirmative action.  
 Just a year later, in the 1977 case Califano v. Webster, the Court addressed 
a challenge to a Social Security provision that allowed women, for the purposes of 
calculating their retirement benefits, to omit three more lower-earning years than 
men. As a result, women’s benefits were skewed toward their later and higher-
earning years, allowing them to qualify for slightly greater Social Security 
benefits. Unlike discriminatory laws that penalize women, the Court explained 
that this provision was not “the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of 
thinking about females but rather was deliberately enacted to compensate for 
particular economic disabilities suffered by women.” The Court applied 
intermediate scrutiny in the decision, arguing that the “reduction of disparity in 
economic condition between men and women caused by the long history of 
discrimination against women has been recognized as an important government 
objective.” This reasoning, according to the Court, fulfilled the intermediate 
scrutiny standard. Thus, in Califano v. Webster, the Court distinguished between 
“invidious gender discrimination and remedial action” and held that “generalized 
societal discrimination provided a sufficient justification for remedial action,” 
such as gender-based affirmative action (Levinson 9).  
 This support for remedial action—namely gender-based affirmative 
action—was again seen in the 1987 case, Johnson v. Transportation Agency of 
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Santa Clara. Paul Johnson, a male employee of the Transportation Agency of 
Santa Clara, was passed over for a promotion; instead, Diane Joyce, a female 
employee, was promoted to the position of road dispatcher. The Transportation 
Agency had an affirmative action plan in place in order to “achieve a statistically 
measurable yearly improvement in hiring and promoting minorities and women in 
job classifications where they are underrepresented.” The Court ruled that the 
Transportation Agency’s promotion procedures were constitutional. In doing so, 
the Court argued that it was “not unreasonable for the Agency to determine that it 
was appropriate to consider as one factor the sex of Ms. Joyce in making its 
decision.” The Court also noted that, “the Agency plan did not unnecessarily 
trammel male employees’ rights or create an absolute bar to their advancement.” 
In fact, the plan set aside no positions for women, and expressly stated that its 
goals “should not be construed as “quotas” that must be met.” In Johnson v. 
Transportation Agency of Santa Clara, the Court utilized the standards laid out in 
Califano v. Webster to decide—for the first time—that a voluntary sex-based 
affirmative action plan can be utilized to overcome the effects of past job 
discrimination based on gender.  
 But what about race-based affirmative action plans? In 1978, just a year 
after Califano v. Webster, four dissenting justices argued that the same standards 
outlined in the decision should be applied to uphold a race-based preference for 
admission to a California medical school in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke. Had they succeeded, this decision would have reestablished a 
legal parallel between racial and gender classification. However, the five justices 
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in the majority in Bakke voted to strike down the University of California 
affirmative action program. In fact, Justice Powell, in his written opinion, 
explicitly rejected the race and gender parallel. Instead, he concludes that 
“whether invidious or benign” all race-based classifications must be subject to 
strict scrutiny (Levinson 9). Though this segment of Powell’s opinion did not 
muster a majority vote, the Supreme Court has relied on the Bakke decision—
decided by the contentious 5-4 margin—in subsequent race-based affirmative 
action decisions. In these cases, the Court has solidified strict scrutiny as the 
standard for race-based affirmative action and has largely rejected societal 
discrimination as a sole justification for such programs. 
 The distinction between the Court’s rulings in Califano v. Webster and 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, illustrates the Court’s divergent 
views on race-based and gender-based affirmative action. Based on the precedent 
in Califano v. Webster, the Court—under the intermediate scrutiny standard—has 
allowed remedial action like gender-based affirmative action. However, based on 
the precedent in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court—
under the strict scrutiny standard—has rejected or limited remedial action in the 
form of race-based affirmative action programs. This distinction at the Supreme 
Court level echoes the public sentiment, which consistently supports not only 
Title IX but also gender-based affirmative action more than race-based 
affirmative action.  
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Chapter 12 
Conclusion 
  
 
 
 
 The Civil Rights and Women’s Rights Movements were two parallel 
revolutions aiming for equality in America. Within a decade of one another, 
African Americans and women gained victories through non-discrimination 
guarantees and preferential treatment programs meant to usher in an era of 
equality in a nation that claims to hold it “self-evident” that all men—and 
women—are created equal. Despite the similarities between the movements and 
the programs they enacted: affirmative action for African Americans and Title IX 
programs for women, the American public received them dramatically differently. 
While Title IX was met with majority support, race-based affirmative action faced 
public disdain. While women utilized Title IX programs to eclipse men in 
collegiate undergraduate enrollment, in just seven years, race-based affirmative 
action programs sputtered. This is due to in-group bias. While America may no 
longer be mired in the era of slavery that treated African Americans as less than 
human, it is not without racial stratification. While I would argue that in-group 
bias is distinct from conscious discrimination, prejudice or racism, it is still a 
subconscious othering that places one group above another. This psychological 
phenomenon has accelerated the adoption and success of Title IX programs, 
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allowing women to surpass men in collegiate undergraduate enrollment, while 
slowing the progress and success of race-based affirmative action programs.  
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Summary of Capstone Project 
 The Civil Rights and Women’s Rights Movements were two of the most 
significant “rights revolutions” in American history. Each spawned radical social 
change in both the workplace and the classroom. This thesis focuses on changes 
in the classroom—specifically in higher education. I chose to focus on higher 
education because I believe that education is at the heart of social change and 
therefore an essential element in both the Civil Rights and Women’s Rights 
Movements. Though similar in their aims, the movements achieved success at 
different rates, particularly in higher education. Whereas the Women’s Rights 
Movement, backed by Title IX legislation, was generally well received by the 
public, the Civil Rights Movement, particularly affirmative action programs, 
faced public resistance. While some of this resistance may have stemmed from 
public confusion surrounding affirmative action, as there was no autonomous 
piece of legislation that enacted affirmative action programs, much of it was 
based on genuine public opposition, which I argue was spurred by in-group bias. 
The public’s resistance to race-based affirmative action programs led to several 
Supreme Court cases challenging the programs including: Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke, Grutter v. Bollinger and most recently Fisher v. 
University of Texas. While there were also numerous federal cases dealing with 
Title IX, most were expansions of the scope of protection under the statute and 
none questioned the need for Title IX enforcement in the academic sector of 
higher education. 
 Based on these findings, this thesis endeavors to answer the following 
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question which has yet to be examined in the field of political science: Did in-
group bias influence public opinion and public backlash in the form of Supreme 
Court litigation, impacting the time it took for race-based affirmative action 
programs to achieve success in comparison with similar women’s rights 
initiatives? It attempts to prove my hypothesis that in-group bias has indeed 
colored the public opinion statistics and has prompted Supreme Court litigation 
against race-based affirmative action programs, slowing their adoption and 
success in relation to women’s right initiatives, namely Title IX.  
 What is in-group bias? In-group bias is a social psychological theory 
developed by William Sumner. It has developed and been identified under several 
nomenclatures: intergroup bias, in-group favoritism, in-group out-group bias and 
in-group bias. For the purposes of this thesis, this sociological phenomenon is 
referred to as in-group bias. Sumner argues that humans, as a species, naturally 
join together in groups. Furthermore, human social interaction arrangements are 
often characterized by the differentiation and separation into in-groups, or groups 
to which an individual belongs, and out-groups, or groups to which an individual 
does not belong. This division is a demarcation of loyalty and cooperation. 
Therefore, in-group bias refers to a pattern in human behavior in which humans 
tend to favor members of their in-groups over members of their out-groups or 
groups perceived as “others.” The study of in-group bias has been used to 
explicate several cultural developments including ethnocentrism, prejudice and 
racism. In this thesis, I attempt to utilize in-group bias to explain why public 
opinion toward race-based affirmative action is so divergent from public opinion 
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toward similar women’s rights initiatives—namely Title IX and gender-based 
affirmative action.  
 What is public opinion? Simply stated, public opinion is the aggregate of 
individual’s beliefs and attitudes surrounding an issue. This definition is similar to 
that of George Gallup, a pioneer in the areas of survey sampling and polling, who 
defined public opinion as “an aggregate of the views men hold regarding matters 
that affect or interest the community.” In the United States, national public 
opinion data provides a snapshot of the nation’s views on controversial issues 
from gay marriage to abortion to affirmative action. In this thesis, public opinion 
data is utilized to illustrate public support or disdain for affirmative action and 
Title IX programs. Based on in-group bias’ effect on public opinion, I attempt to 
explain the different rates of success for affirmative action and Title IX programs 
despite their similarities.  
 What is affirmative action? In its simplest form, affirmative action is a 
preferential treatment program meant to promote advancements toward equality 
for disadvantaged groups. Affirmative action can be broadly read to include any 
policies that take steps to promote equality for specific groups, though it is 
primarily used in describing race-based affirmative action policies benefitting 
African Americans. As a general term, affirmative action encompasses more than 
just the “quotas” or “preferences” for which the program has largely become 
known. The term also refers to open recruiting procedures, efforts to monitor 
progress in hiring and promoting underrepresented groups, contracts set-aside for 
minorities and other proactive policies. Despite being linked to race-based 
57 
policies, affirmative action can also be utilized to benefit other groups such as 
women. Affirmative action policies benefitting women are referred to as gender-
based affirmative action programs in this thesis. What is Title IX? Title IX is a 
portion of the Education Amendments of 1972 that guarantees non-discrimination 
and equal opportunity for women. It states that, “no person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving federal financial assistance.” This thesis attempts to clarify why the 
public treated two seemingly similar programs—affirmative action and Title IX—
so differently and consequently why these programs achieved success at such 
divergent rates.   
 What is the point of success? For the purpose of this thesis, I defined the 
point of the success in higher education for both affirmative action and Title IX 
programs as the point when the percentage of the group—whether women or 
African Americans—in the undergraduate population exceeds the percentage of 
said group in the general American population. As seen in the college enrollment 
data, it took women just 8 years after the passage of Title IX to reach this point. 
On the contrary, it took African Americans 34 years after John F. Kennedy coined 
the term “affirmative action” to reach this point.  
 This thesis attempts to tie all of these terms together. In doing so, it 
attempts to explain how in-group bias colored the public opinion data and spurred 
public backlash in the form of Supreme Court litigation against race-based 
affirmative action programs, slowing their progress toward success in relation to 
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analogous women’s rights initiatives—namely Title IX and gender-based 
affirmative action. 
 This thesis’ significance lies in its historical context and current 
application. It deals with two of the greatest cultural developments in American 
history, the Civil Rights and Women’s Rights Movements. Thus, it relates to a 
key period of rights revolution in American history that is often studied. However, 
more importantly, this thesis has a contemporary application as the Supreme 
Court has heard the Fisher v. University of Texas case, but has yet to rule on it. 
Many scholars have predicted that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the case could 
effectively end affirmative action in higher education. Therefore, affirmative 
action and the success of such programs in higher education are timely issues to 
be examined in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Fisher v. University 
of Texas.  
 
